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THE CRITICAL EFFECT OF A PRETEXT JURY INSTRUCTION
INTRODUCTION
In June 2002, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Townsend
v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,' and added the Tenth Circuit to the
short list of circuits that require a pretext jury instruction in employment
2discrimination cases. A pretext instruction is an instruction to the jury
explaining that if the plaintiff has met his prima facie burden, and the
jury finds an employer's justification for firing the plaintiff unconvinc-
ing, or a "pretext," the jury may infer that discrimination was the basis of
the termination and find for the plaintiff.
3
The subject of this survey is the critical effect of a judge giving a
pretext instruction to the jury. An examination of circuit cases reveals
that where a jury is informed that they are allowed to infer discriminatory
animus based on pretext, they consistently find in favor of the plaintiff.
Inversely, where they are not informed of the inference, they find for the
defendant. This survey contends that if a jury is not informed that they
are allowed to make an inference, they will not make it. There is a dis-
pute about allowing a pretext jury instruction: several circuits regularly
implement pretext instructions, 4 while many others choose not to alert
the jury that it is able to infer discrimination based on pretext.5 This sur-
vey will show which circuits are in favor of a pretext jury instruction,
which ones are not, and show that decisions in circuits that don't allow
the instruction find for defendants when the decision would not have
been for the defendant had there been a pretext jury instruction.
Disparate treatment claims, which encompass every ground on
which to base a discrimination claim (race, gender, religion, age, and
national origin), can be broken into two categories: direct evidence cases
and circumstantial evidence cases.6 A direct evidence case (also known
as a mixed-motive case) is a case where a plaintiff has concrete evidence
showing that the employer discriminated against her.7 In this situation the
employer's defense is to say that it had a mixed-motive in firing the
1. 294 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002).
2. See Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1237-39.
3. See id. at 1238, 1241.
4. See id. at 1237, 1241 (explaining that the Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits are in favor of
a pretext jury instruction).
5. See id. at 1238-39 (explaining that the First, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits are not
in favor of a pretext jury instruction).
6. See Hill v. Burrell Comm. Group, Inc., 67 F.3d 665, 667 (7th Cir. 1995). See generally
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252-55 (1989) (describing how courts apply either a
clear and convincing standard or a preponderance of the evidence standard when analyzing claims of
discrimination).
7. See generally Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246-53 (identifying factors that if proven
constitute direct evidence of discrimination).
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plaintiff, i.e., there were several reasons for terminating the plaintiff,
only one of which was discriminatory.8 The burden in a direct evidence
case is placed on the employer to show that the plaintiff would have re-
ceived the same treatment even without the discriminatory motive.9 This
survey will not focus on direct evidence cases.
A circumstantial evidence case is a case where a plaintiff was fired
for reasons that she suspects are discriminatory, but has no concrete evi-
dence to show discriminatory animus.' 0 In this situation, the plaintiff
must present a prima facie case as established by McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.' Once the plaintiff satisfies the prima facie require-
ments, the burden shifts to the employer to present legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for terminating the plaintiff.12 At this point, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who then must show that the em-
ployer's proffered reasons are pretextual; or a false cover-up of discrimi-
natory animus.13 The jury then weighs the credibility of each party's ex-
planation, and disbelief of the employer's reasons can be sufficient to
carry a verdict for the plaintiff. 14
This survey will focus on circumstantial evidence cases where the
plaintiff has met her prima facie burden and the employer has proffered
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Further, this
survey will focus specifically on Townsend and the implications of the
Tenth Circuit's holding that, in such situations, a pretext instruction is
required. 15
8. See id. at 245-48.
9. See id. at 244-45.
10. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (holding that a
plaintiff proved a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII even though the plaintiff did not
have concrete evidence of discrimination).
11. 411 U.S. 792, 802-03.
12. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
13. Id. at 804. It is important to note that no label for this distinction is satisfactory. There are
situations in a circumstantial or indirect evidence case where the plaintiff does have direct evidence
of discrimination. See Hill, 67 F.3d at 667. However, that direct evidence may be insufficient, on its
own, to carry a verdict for the plaintiff or even to move the case under the more favorable and plain-
tiff-friendly Price Waterhouse framework. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 266-71 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[Under the Price Waterhouse framework] I do not think that the employer is entitled
to the same presumption of good faith [as under the McDonnell Douglas framework] where there is
direct evidence that it has placed substantial reliance on factors whose consideration is forbidden by
Title VII."); 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 43
(Paul W. Cane, Jr. et al. eds., 3d ed. 1996) ("[T]he plaintiff presumably must offer stronger evidence
to invoke the mixed-motive framework than that needed to establish a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine-Hicks."). Thus, the direct/indirect distinction can be misleading and
even incorrect. I chose to use the direct/circumstantial labels because the cases examined in this
survey consist of situations where the plaintiff has some (albeit a minuscule amount of) direct evi-
dence showing discrimination, and I concede that the label chosen is subject to dispute and possibly
confusion.
14. See Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1237.
15. See id. at 1237, 1239, 1241.
[Vol. 80:3
PRETEXT JURY INSTRUCTIONS
I. BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF THE INDIRECT EVIDENCE
BURDEN SHIFTING FRAMEWORK
A. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
16
McDonnell Douglas is the landmark decision regarding disparate
treatment claims in employment law cases. 17 In McDonnell Douglas,
Percy Green worked for the defendant, McDonnell Douglas Corporation,
for eight years before he was "laid off in the course of a general reduc-
tion in [the defendant's] work force."'18 Green was a member of the Con-
gress on Racial Equality ("CRE") and "protested vigorously that his dis-
charge and the general hiring practices of [the defendant] were racially
motivated."' 9 Green, along with other members of the CRE, organized a
"stall-in, ' 0 where numerous vehicles were deliberately stalled on major
roads leading to the defendant's factory during the morning rush hour.21
Weeks later, Green and members of the CRE were involved in a "lock-
in,' 22 where a padlock was placed on the factory doors preventing the
defendant's employees from leaving.23
Three weeks after the lock-in, the defendant sought to hire qualified
mechanics, and Green, a qualified mechanic, immediately applied for re-
24employment. Defendant "turned down [Green], basing its rejection on
[Green's] participation in the 'stall-in' and 'lock-in.' 25 Green then filed
a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
"claiming that [the defendant] had refused to re-hire him because of his
,,26race and persistent involvement in the civil rights movement.
The district court found that the defendant's "refusal to rehire
[Green] was based solely on his participation in the illegal demonstra-
tions and not on his legitimate civil rights activities. 27 The Eighth Cir-
cuit affirmed,2 8 and the Supreme Court granted certioriari.29
16. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
17. William R. Corbett, Of Babies, Bathwater, and Throwing Out Proof Structures: It is Not
Time to Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 361, 361 (1998).




22. Id. at 795.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 796.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 797.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 798.
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In deciding McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court announced the
framework to be used in deciding Title VII employment discrimination
cases:
30
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden
... of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. This may be
done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seek-
ing applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.
31
After determining that the Green met his prima facie requirements,32 the
Court moved to its "burden shifting" framework.3 3
After a plaintiff has met his prima facie requirement, "[t]he burden
then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employee's rejection. ' 34 In this case, the de-
fendant contended that its reason for rejecting Green was his involve-
ment in the illegal "stall-in" and "lock-in" protests.35 The Court found
that the defendant's "reason for rejection thus suffices to meet the prima
facie case, but the inquiry must not end here... [the plaintiff] must...
be afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the defendant's] stated rea-
son for [the plaintiffs] rejection was in fact pretext., 36 Thus, the plaintiff
"must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent
evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in
fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision."
37
B. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
38
To modify the framework enumerated in McDonnell Douglas, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Burdine39 to determine whether,
"after the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discriminatory treat-
ment, the burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the court by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons
for the challenged employment action existed."4 The Court explained
30. "Indeed, McDonnell Douglas has been so influential that it has spread beyond
employment discrimination cases to employment actions brought under other types of federal and
state employment laws and to discrimination cases in contexts other than employment law." Corbett,
supra note 17, at 363-64.




35. See id. at 803.
36. Id. at 804.
37. Id. at 805.
38. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
39. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252.
40. Id. at 250.
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that the burden that shifts to the defendant after the plaintiff has met her
prima facie burden is a burden of production.41 "The burden that shifts to
the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the presumption of discrimination by
producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was
preferred, for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. ''42 The Court further
explained that:
the defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually moti-
vated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant's evi-
dence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated
against the plaintiff... If the defendant carries this burden of pro-
duction, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted,
and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.
43
At this point in the opinion, the Court engaged in a technical exami-
nation of what happens next under the framework.44 The Court ex-
plained:
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now must have the
opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true
reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with
the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the vic-
tim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either di-
rectly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the em-
ployer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.
45
It is this examination that caused confusion among the lower courts, and
that ultimately warranted the Court's 1993 decision in St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks.46
The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting framework is as
follows. A plaintiff must carry her prima facie burden of showing that
the factors requisite for a discrimination case exist.47 Upon carrying this
requirement, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for its actions exist.48 This, however, is
merely a burden of production.49 The defendant need not persuade the
court that the proffered reasons were its actual motivation; the defendant
need only rebut the presumption of discrimination that was created when
41. See id. at 255.
42. Id. at 254 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 254-55 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
44. See id. at 255-56.
45. Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
46. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). See generally Corbett, supra note
17, at 361 (examining the effect of the Burdine decision and the resulting St. Mary's decision).
47. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
48. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 506-07.
49. See id. at 507.
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the plaintiff established her prima facie case.5° Upon meeting the burden
of production, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who must then ei-
ther directly show that a discriminatory reason more likely was the true
motivation, or indirectly show that the reasons presented by the defen-
dant are a mere pretext to cover the defendant's true discriminatory mo-
tivations. 51
This was the framework in employment discrimination cases for
over a decade.52
C. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
53
In this case, Melvin Hicks, a black man, was hired by St. Mary's
Honor Center in 1978 and promoted to a supervisory position in 1980.54
In 1983, St. Mary's conducted an administrative investigation that re-
sulted in extensive personnel shifts, and while Hicks retained his posi-
tion, two new supervisors were placed above him.55 "Prior to these per-
sonnel changes [Hicks] had enjoyed a satisfactory employment record,
but soon thereafter became the subject of repeated, and increasingly se-
vere, disciplinary actions. 56 Following a suspension, letter of reprimand,
and demotion, Hicks was fired for threatening his boss "during an ex-
change of heated words."57 Hicks then brought suit alleging that St.
Mary's had violated Title VII by "demoting and then discharging him
because of his race. 58 The district court found for St. Mary's and the
Eighth Circuit reversed.59
The Supreme Court used this opportunity to add a caveat to the
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework: "although the McDonnell
Douglas presumption shifts the burden of production to the defendant,
'[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with
the plaintiff." '6° The Supreme Court added the caveat because of the way
that the district and circuit court analyzed the case below. 61 The district
court "found that the reasons [St. Mary's] gave were not the real reasons
for [Hicks'] demotion and discharge., 62 It "nonetheless held that [Hicks]
had failed to carry his ultimate burden of proving that his race was the
50. See id.
51. See id. at 507-08.
52. Burdine was decided in 1981 and St. Mary's was decided in 1993. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248;
St. Mary's, 509 U.S. 502.
53. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
54. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 504.
55. Id. at 504-05.




60. Id. at 507 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
61. See id. at 507-09 (comparing the analyses of the district and circuit court).
62. Id. at 508.
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determining factor in [St. Mary's] decision to... dismiss him. '' 63 Thus,
"although [Hicks] ha[d] proven the existence of a crusade to terminate
him, he ha[d] notFroven that the crusade was racially rather than person-
ally motivated." The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that "[o]nce
[Hicks] proved all of [St. Mary's] proffered reasons for the adverse em-
ployment actions to be pretextual, [Hicks] was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law., 65 The Eighth Circuit came to this conclusion by reason-
ing that:
[b]ecause all of defendant's proffered reasons were discredited, de-
fendants were in a position of having offered no legitimate reason for
their actions. In other words, defendants were in no better position
than if they had remained silent, offering no rebuttal to an established
inference that they had unlawfully discriminated against plaintiff on
the basis of his race.66
The Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's analysis with an
emphatic, "that is not so. ''67 The Court explained that the defendant's
burden of production contains no credibility assessment, and that merely
producing evidence tending to rebut plaintiff s contentions, regardless of
68weight, satisfies the burden of production.
At this point, the Court analyzed what it said in Burdine versus
what it meant.69 The Court began by explaining that when it used the
term "pretext" it meant "pretext for discrimination," 70 and that "a reason
cannot be proved to be a 'pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown
both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real rea-
son."71 So, at every point in Burdine where the Court mentioned "pre-
,,72
text," the reader is to understand it as "pretext for discrimination.
Next, the Court explained what it meant when it said that after a de-
fendant has proffered reasons for its decision, the plaintiffs burden to
show that the proffered reasons are untrue "merges with the ultimate
burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination. 73 When the Court said "merges," it did not mean that
"the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim
of intentional discrimination' is replaced by the mere burden of 'demon-




66. Id. at 508-09 (quoting Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir.
1992)).
67. Id. at 509.
68. See id.
69. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text, for the disputed language from Burdine.
70. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 515-16.
71. Id. at 515.
72. See id. at516.
73. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
2003]
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ployment decision. 74 The Court meant "that proving the employer's
reason false becomes part of (and often considerably assists) the greater
enterprise of proving that the real reason was intentional discrimina-
tion. 75
Finally, the Court asserted that its statement in Burdine, that a plain-
tiff may prove intentional discrimination "indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence, ' 76 was inad-
vertent dicta,77 and that disproof of a defendant's proffered reason is an
auxiliary, rather than independent, means of proving unlawful discrimi-
nation.78
The final result of the St. Mary's decision is that a plaintiff must
first prove her prima facie case under the framework established by
McDonnell Douglas.79 A light burden of production is then placed on the
defendant to show evidence of non-discriminatory intent.80 Regardless of
the weight or credibility of this evidence, a plaintiff is entitled to a judg-
ment only if the evidence, taken as true, would not allow the conclusion
that there was a non-discriminatory rationale behind the adverse action
and the plaintiff has proved her prima facie case by a preponderance of
the evidence.8' So, in addition to producing a prima facie case, and on
top of showing that the defendant's reasons are mere pretext, a plaintiff
must produce evidence that shows that discrimination actually occurred,
because finding pretext is auxiliary to finding discrimination, not
independent.82
Following the St. Mary's decision, it was unclear whether pretext
alone could justify a verdict for the plaintiff because Burdine indicated
that pretext alone was sufficient 83 and St. Mary's indicated that the
statement in Burdine was "inadvertent dictum.,
84
D. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.85
In 2000, the Supreme Court decided Reeves to resolve the ambigui-
ties of the St. Mary's decision; specifically, the indications that "pretext-
plus" was the standard in employment discrimination cases.86 So, in
Reeves the Court set out to determine "whether a defendant is entitled to
74. Id.
75. Id. at 517.
76. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
77. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 518.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 506; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (discussing the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie framework).
80. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 506-07.
81. Id. at 509.
82. See id. at 518.
83. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
84. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 518.
85. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
86. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 137.
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judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff's case consists exclusively
of a prima facie case of discrimination and sufficient evidence for the
trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory
explanation for its action. 87
In 1995, plaintiff Roger Reeves was 57 and had worked for defen-
dant Sanderson Plumbing Products for 40 years.88 Reeves was responsi-
ble for recording the hours the people under his supervision worked and
for reviewing weekly reports that listed the hours worked for each em-
ployee.89 In the summer of 1995, Caldwell, Reeves's direct supervisor,
informed Sanderson's executive officials that production was down in
Reeves's department because employees under Reeves's supervision
were often absent and coming in late and leaving early. 90 However, be-
cause Reeves's records indicated no problems, Sanderson executives
ordered an audit of Reeves's department.9' The investigation revealed
that Reeves and his co-supervisors made "numerous timekeeping errors
and misrepresentations. 9 Following the audit, Sanderson executives
recommended that the company fire Reeves and one of his co-
93supervisors.
Reeves filed suit, contending that he had been fired because of his
age.94 At trial, Sanderson argued that it "fired [Reeves] due to his failure
to maintain accurate attendance records. 95 Reeves attempted to demon-
strate that Sanderson's explanation was pretext for age discrimination by
introducing evidence that his records were accurately maintained and,
further, that his immediate supervisor had "demonstrated age-based ani-
96mus" in his dealings with Reeves.
The district court, after twice denying Sanderson's motions for
judgment as a matter of law, instructed the jury that "if the plaintiff fails
to prove age was a determinative or motivating factor in the decision to
terminate him, then your verdict shall be for the defendant." 97 The jury
"found that [Sanderson's] age discrimination had been 'willfu[l]"' and












97. Id. at 138-39.
98. Id. at 139 (alteration in original) (quoting Reeves, 197 F.3d at 691).
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for Reeves in the amount of $70,000, including "$35,000 in liquidated
damages based on the jury's finding of willfulness." 99
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Reeves "had not introduced
sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's finding of unlawful discrimina-
tion."' ° The Fifth Circuit noted that Reeves may have presented suffi-
cient evidence for a finding of pretext, but that pretext alone was not
sufficient to resolve the ultimate issue of whether Reeves presented evi-
dence sufficient to show that age was the motivating factor in Sander-
son's employment decision.'0 '
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, noting that the circuit
court "misconceived" the St. Mary's decision in reversing the district
court.'0 2 In fact, the Court spent two pages explaining what it meant
when it decided St. Mary'S. °3 The Court started by stating that it "held
that the fact-finder's rejection of the employer's legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reasons for its action does not compel judgment for the plain-
tiff." °4 The Court continued: "In other words, '[i]t is not enough ... to
disbelieve the employer, the fact-finder must believe the plaintiffs ex-
planation of intentional discrimination."' 0 5 To get to "this conclusion,
however, [the Court] reasoned that it is permissible for the trier of fact to
infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the em-
ployer's explanation. ' °6 The Court noted:
In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer
from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to
cover up a discriminatory purpose. . . .Moreover, once the em-
ployer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be
the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer
is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision. 1
07
The Court then resolved the St. Mary's ambiguity by concluding
that "a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to
find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the
trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated."' 0'
Resting on this analysis, the Court held that "because a prima facie case
and sufficient evidence to reject the employer's explanation may permit a




102. Id. at 146.
103. See id. at 146-48.
104. Id. at 146.
105. Id. at 147 (quoting St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 519).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 148.
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premise that a plaintiff must always introduce additional, independent
evidence of discrimination. ' ' 1 9
The ambiguity of the St. Mary's decision has been resolved, and a
finding that the employer's justification was a pretext, combined with
prima facie evidence, is sufficient for a jury to find in favor of a plain-
tiff.10° The split that now exists between the circuits is over whether the
jury should be informed that a finding of pretext (assuming the plaintiff
has met her prima facie burden) is sufficient to find in favor of the plain-
tiff."'
II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT: REQUIRING A JURY INSTRUCTION INDICATING
THAT INFERENCE OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON PRETEXT Is ALLOWED
A. Tenth Circuit: Townsend v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co."12
Prior to the Townsend decision, the Tenth Circuit had not dealt spe-
cifically with whether to require a pretext jury instruction in employment
discrimination cases. 1 3 Townsend is the focus of this survey because of
its holding that a pretext jury instruction is required in employment dis-
crimination cases that involve circumstantial evidence. 1 4 Townsend
aligns the Tenth Circuit with the Second and Third Circuit in holding that
a pretext jury instruction is required in circumstantial evidence employ-
ment discrimination cases." 5
1. Facts
John Townsend began working for defendant Lumberman's Mutual
Casualty Company in 1986.'16 Over the course of eleven years, Town-
send, a black man, enjoyed numerous merit raises and performance bo-
nuses."17 Citing Townsend's "poor performance," the defendant began
demoting Townsend, and then nine months later fired him." 8 Town-
send's supervisor "informed Townsend that he could either resign or be
demoted to ... a non-management position."" 9 Townsend accepted the
demotion, and a white female, Maureen O'Connor, filled his manage-
ment position. 20 Eight months later, O'Connor terminated Townsend.'
2'
109. Id. at 149.
110. Id.
111. Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1237-39.
112. 294 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002).
113. Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1237.
114. See id. at 1241.
115. Id.; Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 280-81 (3d Cir. 1998); Cabrera v.
Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 382 (2d Cir. 1994).
116. Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1234.
117. See id. at 1232, 1234.
118. Id. at 1234.
119. Id. at 1235.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1236.
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Townsend filed an action in which he alleged that "he had been de-
moted and ultimately fired because of his race ... and that he had been
retaliated against for complaining of race discrimination."' 122 He argued
that even though he objectively outperformed Chris Gold, a white man
who held a similar position, Gold was made eligible for a promotion and
Townsend was not. 23 Further, Townsend contended that he was criti-
cized by his supervisor for "giving favorable treatment to black subordi-
nates." 124 The defendant maintained that Townsend was fired because he
"failed to increase sales in his territory" and "failed to show up on time
for scheduled meetings."'
125
The case went to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the de-
fendant. 12 6 Townsend "filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that
the district court had erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the issue of
pretext." 27 The district court denied the motion. 1
28
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit's primary motivation for overruling the district
court was the high likelihood that a jury would be unable to correctly
apply facts without a jury instruction.1 29 The Tenth Circuit noted that
even after the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split over "pretext-
plus" in St. Mary's, federal courts were still not awarding verdicts to
plaintiffs in pretext cases. 130 Rather than trust juries to reach the correct
conclusion on their own in complex employment discrimination pretext
cases, the Tenth Circuit decided to require a pretext jury instruction in
circumstantial evidence cases. 131 After examining decisions in other cir-
cuit courts, the Tenth Circuit believed that the critical issue was "whether
in the absence of any instructions about pretext, 'the jury found for the
defendant because it believed the plaintiff could not prevail without af-
firmative evidence that his race was a motivating factor in the challenged
employment decisions. '"1 32 Persuaded that juries were being led astray,
the Tenth Circuit held that "in cases such as this, a trial court must in-
122. Id. at 1233.
123. Id. at 1234.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1233.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 1241 ("[T]his is a difficult matter for the courts, and would certainly be difficult
for a jury. We consider the danger too great that a jury might make the same assumption that the
Fifth Circuit did in Reeves [v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688 (5th Cir. 1999), that
finding that the defendant's explanation was a pretext was not a sufficient basis for a finding in favor
of the plaintiff].").
130. Id. at 1240-41. "Pretext plus" was a theory that said that "a jury's rejection of an em-
ployee's proffered explanation could not, by itself, suffice to show discriminatory motive." Id. at
1240.
131. Id. at 1241.
132. Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 10,
Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-3055)).
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struct jurors that if they disbelieve an employer's proffered explanation
they may--but need not--infer that the employer's true motive was dis-
criminatory.' 33
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Townsend indicates that if a plaintiff
meets her prima facie burden, a jury may infer discrimination if the em-
ployer is unable to convince the jury of a legitimate, non-discriminatory
rationale. 134 More importantly, the Tenth Circuit now requires that a jury
must be informed that they are allowed to infer discriminatory animus
from the circumstances alone.
135
B. Other Circuits: No Pretext Jury Instruction Required
1. First Circuit: Fite v. Digital Equipment Corp. 1
36
a. Facts
Plaintiff David Fite was fired after twenty years of employment
with the defendant, Digital Equipment Corporation, because of "substan-
dard" performance. 137 Fite filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that he was discharged
because of his age, 53, and disability, a chemical dependence on co-
caine.1
38
In the district court a jury found against Fite on his discrimination
and retaliation claims.' 39 The jury was not given a pretext instruction.'n
b. Decision
On appeal Fite argued that "the jury should have been told affirma-
tively that a prima facie case, coupled with finding of pretext, would
permit the jury to infer discrimination." 14 1 The First Circuit held that
"while permitted, we doubt that such an explanation is compulsory."' 142
The First Circuit is thus in alignment with Reeves: "'[T]he falsity of the
employer's explanation' may permit the jury to infer a discriminatory
motive but does not compel such a finding.' ' 143 So, despite being aligned
with the Supreme Court by allowing inference of discrimination based on
pretext, a pretext jury instruction is not mandated in the First Circuit.
144
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. 232 F.3d 3 (1 st Cir, 2000).
137. Fite, 232 F.3d at 4-5.
138. Id.
139. Id. at5.
140. See id. at 7.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)).
144. See id.
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2. Seventh Circuit: Gehring v. Case Corp. 1
45
a. Facts
Plaintiff Dale Gehring was discharged in a general lay-off scheme
during a downsizing. 146 Gehring contended that his age, 52, was the de-
terminative factor in defendant Case Corporation's decision to fire
him. 147 The jury found in favor of the defendant, and Gehring appealed




The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, concluding
that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies exclu-
sively to pretrial proceedings and "not to the jury's evaluation of evi-
dence at trial."' 149 The court continued its analysis with the proposition
that pretext itself is not an element to be examined:
Once the judge finds that the plaintiff has made the minimum neces-
sary demonstration (the 'prima facie case') and that the defendant has
produced an age-neutral explanation, the burden-shifting apparatus
has served its purpose, and the only remaining question--the only
question the jury need answer--is whether the plaintiff is a victim of
intentional discrimination. 1
50
Thus, in the Seventh Circuit, not only is a pretext instruction not allowed,
but an inquiry into pretext itself is impermissible outside of pretrial mo-
tions.15'
3. Seventh Circuit: Russell v. Acme-Evans Co.'52
a. Facts
Plaintiff John Russell, a 59-year old black man, was hired by the
Acme-Evans Company in 1975, and from 1977 to 1990 Russell worked
as "mill sweeper," a job that he enjoyed and that was considered light
work.153 By 1990, Russell had worked at the plant longer than anyone
else. 154 In 1990, new supervisors, who were white, began giving Russell
"warnings for failing to wash his hands and for other infractions of work
145. 43 F.3d 340 (7th Cir. 1994).
146. Gehring, 43 F.3d at 342.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 342-43.
149. Id. at 343.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 344.
152. 51 F.3d 64 (7th Cir. 1995).




rules."' t5 5 In 1992, when Russell was 59 years old, the management trans-
ferred Russell from mill sweeper to "skid wrapper," "a more strenuous
and monotonous job."'156 Russell claimed that "he was transferred to
make room for a young white man who wanted to be 'downgraded' from
assistant miller to mill sweeper."' 157 Soon after Russell was transferred,
he applied for the vacant assistant miller position, "but was turned down
in favor of a young white man."' 158 In 1993, Russell applied to work
"overtime as a member of the blow-down crew,"' a four person group
that cleans the grain elevator. 59 Again, Acme declined Russell's applica-
tion, "giving the opportunity for overtime work to a younger white
man."IN
Russell contended that the denial of the blow-down opportunity, his
transfer to skid wrapper, and the denial of his application for the assistant
miller position were motivated by race and age discrimination.1 61 Acme
offered several nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. 62 First, Acme
contended that Russell was transferred to skid wrapper because, "in light
of his disciplinary infractions, he required closer supervision than was
feasible for a sweeper."'' 63 Second, he "had been turned down for the
assistant miller job because he was not trained for it and the white man
who was given the job 'demonstrated mechanical aptitude' and 'worked
well with others. '' 164 Further, Acme noted that they offered the assistant
miller job to a black man "before the white man, but [he] had turned it
down."' 65 Finally, Acme contended that Russell was turned down for the
blow-down crew because Russell was already working a substantial
amount of overtime and "because at 190 pounds he was too heavy" for
one of the crew's critical positions. 66 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Acme. 167
b. Decision
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit noted that "the only evidence
submitted in opposition to the employer's motion for summary judgment
is the plaintiffs own testimony,"'' 68 and that the evidence "required to
contradict the employer's evidence is rarely within the plaintiff s compe-
155. Id.












168. Id. at 68.
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tence to give."169 Russell insisted that his claim should go to a jury, hop-
ing that a jury would infer discriminatory animus from the employer's
pretextual reasons for its actions. 7 ° The Seventh Circuit, however, af-
firmed the district court, concluding that a jury trial was not necessary
because "[ifn the face of Acme-Evans' uncontested grounds for transfer-
ring Russell, and with no evidence that Acme-Evans' true motivation
was racial, no reasonable jury could infer from doubt ... that the true
motivation was indeed race." 171 The circuit court went on to state: "There
is no basis for confidence that the defendant did not discriminate against
Russell on account of his race and age; it is simply that Russell has not
presented enough evidence ... to withstand the company's motion.' 72
Finally, the court stated, "[T]here is nothing in our power to do that
would lighten the burden of the employee without depriving the em-
ployer of procedural rights."'
173
4. Seventh Circuit: Hill v. Burrell Communications Group, Inc. 1
74
a. Facts
In this case, the plaintiff, Sandra Hill, was fired from her position as
Director of Print Production at Burrell Communications Group.
7 5
Burrell contended that the reason it fired Hill was "decline in print pro-
duction volume" and necessary "personnel cutbacks."' 176 However, Hill, a
white woman, contended that Burrell, an advertising agency with a focus
on minority markets and primarily minority employees, fired her based
on reverse discrimination. 77 Hill filed suit.' 78 To back her contention,
Hill introduced evidence at trial that shortly after her departure, Burrell
hired Roxanne Hubbard, a black woman, for the position of Print Pro-
duction, Supervisor, with substantially the same responsibilities as Hill,
even though Burrell said that it had eliminated her position.179 Hill also
introduced evidence of a conversation in which her supervisor stated to





171. Id. at 70.
172. Id. at 70-71.
173. Id. at 71.
174. 67 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 1995).




179. See id. at 667.
180. See id. This is a situation where the plaintiff did introduce some direct evidence (what the
supervisor said). However, this case falls under the indirect or circumstantial evidence rubric, and is
an example of why the "circumstantial evidence," rather than "indirect evidence" label, is more
appropriate and less confusing.
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The district court granted Burrell's motion for summary judgment
"on the ground that plaintiffs position was eliminated and her employ-
ment was terminated because of a steady decline in print production
business. '18 1 "[T]he district Judge stated that Hill had not presented suf-
ficient evidence to demonstrate that Burrell's proffered legitimate reason
for firing her was pretextual."'
' 82
b. Decision
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. 83 The court concluded, first, that the
supervisor's ambiguous statement to Burrell's personnel administrator
could not lead a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that the statement
"reveals a discriminatory intent."'' 84 Second, the court did not find
Burrell's hiring of Roxanne Hubbard convincing because "the evidence
shows that Hubbard's duties as supervisor were not identical to Hill's
duties as director."' 85 Therefore, "Hubbard was not given Hill's position
but instead received the lesser title and duties of Print Production Super-
visor with a lower salary than Hill."' 86 The Seventh Circuit concluded,
despite circumstantial evidence to the contrary, that Hill had "presented
no evidence to contradict defendant's showing that the desire to reduce
costs motivated Hill's termination."'
' 87
5. Eighth Circuit: Moore v. Robertson Fire Protection District
88
a. Facts
The Robertson Fire District was seeking a fire chief. 89 A total of
nineteen individuals submitted applications, and, after reviewing re-
sumes, the fire district selected a few individuals for interviews, one of
whom was black. 90 Cornelius Moore, a black man, was not selected for
an interview.' 9' Moore initiated an action "after discovering that the
board had hired David Tilley, a white man who did not meet many of the
requirements placed in the ad."'
192
The jury instructions submitted by the district court were as follows:
"Your verdict must be for Plaintiff . . . and against Defendant . . . on
Plaintiff s claim of race discrimination if all the following elements have
been proved by the greater weight of the evidence: [fjirst, Defendant
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 670.
184. Id. at 669.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 670.
187. Id.
188. 249 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2001).
189. Moore, 249 F.3d at 787.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 788.
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failed to hire plaintiff; and [s]econd, Plaintiffs race was a motivating
factor in Defendant's decision. 193 Moore requested that a pretext in-
struction be added to "motivating factor."' 94 His suggested instruction
read: "You may find that Plaintiffs race was a motivating factor in de-
fendant's decision not to hire plaintiff, if it has been proved by a greater
weight of the evidence that Defendant's stated reasons for its decision
are not the true reason, but are a "pretext' [sic] to hide discriminatory
motivation."' 95 The district court rejected Moore's proposed instructions
and he appealed, claiming that the refusal was an error.' 96 Moore argued
"that the omission of this instruction impermissibly prevented the jury
from considering whether the Fire District's reasons for not interviewing





The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision because
"[t]he instructions provided by the District Court presented the proper
legal standard for the jury's consideration, namely, whether Moore's race
was a motivating factor in his non-selection."198 The Eighth Circuit,
however, is not averse to pretext in general.199 The court noted that "[i]n
deciding the 'motivating factor' question, the jury was free to consider
Moore's evidence of pretext,' '200 and "although the District Court elected
not to submit a pretext instruction, it in no way prevented Moore from
presenting his pretext arguments to the jury. '2°
6. Eleventh Circuit: Palmer v. Board of Regents
202
a. Facts
Judy Palmer was a temporary assistant professor at Kennesaw State
203University. She applied for a permanent position in the foreign lan-
guage department, but was not selected.2° Palmer then filed suit, con-
tending that the University did not hire her because she was Jewish.20 5
Palmer sought to introduce evidence tending to show that the Univer-
sity's proffered reasons were pretextual; specifically, she wanted a wit-
ness to testify that "two members of the search committee had stated that
hiring [Palmer] could be problematic because she was Jewish and her
193. Id. at 789.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 788-89.
197. Id. at 789.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 791.
200. Id. at 789.
201. Id. at 791.
202. 208 F.3d 969 (11 th Cir. 2000).
203. Palmer, 208 F.3d at 971.
204. Id. at 971-72.
205. Id. at 972.
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husband was a lawyer. ' 2°6 The district court did not allow this testi-
mony.2 °7
At trial, Palmer submitted a jury instruction that "specifically expli-
cated that if the jury found that the reasons offered by the University
System to justify its hiring decision were pretextual, it would be author-
ized to find intentional religious discrimination on the part of the Univer-
sity System., 208 The court declined to give Palmer's instruction, and the
209jury found in favor of the University.
b. Decision
On appeal, Palmer argued that the jury instructions used by the dis-
trict court were "not properly balanced because 'the jury was not specifi-
cally informed that it was authorized to find for the Plaintiff without any
additional evidence of discrimination.' 2'0 The Eleventh Circuit did not
accept this contention, explaining:
The argument that the jury may draw a permissible inference of in-
tentional religious discrimination if it disbelieves the University Sys-
tem's stated reason for not hiring Palmer is a logical extension of our
prior decisions . . . that the jury is entitled to infer discrimination
from pretext.
However, in this case, we cannot say that the trial court erred in
its instructions to the jury.
211
C. Other Circuits: Pretext Jury Instruction Required
1. Second Circuit: Cabrera v. Jakabovitz
21 2
a. Facts
A landlord, Jakabovitz, was suspected of employing discriminatory
practices in evaluating applicants for his apartment complexes.2t 3 In sum,
white people inquiring about housing were given applications and tours,
while members of minority groups who inquired about the same apart-
ments were told there were no openings or, alternatively, were steered
towards neighborhoods composed primarily of minorities.1 4 The jury
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. Id. at 972-73.
209. Id. at 973.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 974-75.
212. 24 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1994).
213. Cabrera, 24 F.3d at 378.
214. Id. at 377-79.
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found in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that Jakabovitz discriminated
against two minority applicants in violation of Title VII.
215
b. Decision
The Second Circuit stated that if a defendant produces evidence to
rebut a plaintiff's prima facia case, the members of the jury must be in-
structed that they are entitled to infer that the plaintiff has met his burden
of proving discrimination if they disbelieve the defendant's rebuttal.2 6
On appeal, Jakabovitz argued that "the [c]ourt erred in instructing the
jury that he bore the burden of establishing that race played no role in his
decision not to show an apartment to the African-American or Latino
tester.,217 The district court had given the following jury instruction:
[A] defendant must establish that his decision not to offer an avail-
able apartment to plaintiff was based completely on considerations
other than race or national origin, that is[,] the defendant must show
that race played no role whatsoever in his decision not to afford the
plaintiff access to an available apartment.
218
The Second Circuit concluded that the lower court's instruction was er-
roneous.2 9 The Second Circuit found, however, that "[b]ecause of the
[district] [clourt's extensive and repeated instructions that the plaintiff
bore the burden of proving discrimination ...the jury could not have
been led astray by the [c]ourt's brief comment to the contrary.
' 220




Associates Financial Services Company ("AFSC") hired Deborah
222Zimmermann in 1996 as a Business Development Director. During her
employment, Zimmermann "worked out of her home, faxing weekly
progress reports" to her supervisor.2 3 In April 1997, ASFC hired
Stephen Haslam to be Zimmermann's new supervisor.224 Haslam ex-
pected a different, "more proactive," work product, and Zimmermann's
duties became more involved and less independent.225 Zimmermann
worked for Haslam for less than two months, and "[o]n Haslam's fifty-
215. Id. at 379.
216. Id. at 382.
217. Id. at 383.
218. Id. (alterations in original).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 384.
221. 251 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2001).
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first day, he fired Zimmermann. 226 She "testified that when she asked
Haslam to explain why she was being fired, he insisted that it 'had noth-
ing to do with [her] performance,' but explained instead that she 'didn't
have a good relationship' with .. one of her supervisors." 227 However,
that supervisor "did not speak with Haslam about Zimmermann prior to
her firing., 228 Further, Haslam entered "inferior performance" as the rea-
son for Zimmermann's firing on her last payroll entry.229
Zimmermann, however, "had exceeded her goals for the second
quarter of 1997" by about six percent. 230 Additionally, the first time
Zimmermann met Haslam face-to-face was when she was fired, and she
"had never received any warnings or criticism of her performance from
Haslam or any other supervisors prior to being fired.",23' Further,
Zimmermann was 49 when she was fired and she "was replaced by
Stephen Mitchell, a slightly younger male. 232 Then, "a week after firing
Zimmermann, Haslam recommended the termination of another of the
three female Business Development Directors. 233 During that same time
period, no male Business Development Directors were fired.234
"Zimmermann filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging that she was
terminated because of her sex and age. 235 The jury, after receiving a
pretext jury instruction, returned a verdict for Zimmermann on her gen-
der discrimination claim, "awarding $165,000 in back pay, $50,000 in
compensatory damages, and $1,000,000 in punitive damages.2 36 The
district court reduced the damages and entered judgment for
Zimmermann "in a total amount of $452,979. '237
b. Decision
The Second Circuit framed the issue this way:
The evidence in this case plainly permitted the jury to infer that
the Defendant's proffered reason for her discharge--deficient work
performance--was pretextual. Therefore, the issue as to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence is whether the record as a whole, including
whatever reasonable inference the jury could draw from the proffer









235. Id. at 380.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 383.
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of a false reason for the discharge, permitted the required ultimate
finding of discrimination.
238
The court also noted that "only occasionally will a prima facie case plus
pretext fall short of the burden a plaintiff carries to reach a jury on the
ultimate question of discrimination. 239 In this light, the court affirmed
the jury's finding of discrimination based on pretext.2 4°
Zimmerman presented evidence that she was fired for reasons that
Haslam could not explain.241 She further showed that Haslam had dem-
onstrated discriminatory animus against other female employees by rec-
ommending their termination. 242 There was only circumstantial evidence
of discrimination in this case. However, in the Second Circuit, this was
deemed sufficient to support a finding of discrimination.243
3. Third Circuit: Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg
244
a. Facts
Edward Smith alleged that his age, 61, was the dispositive factor in
his employer's decision not to renew his employment contract.245 In
1989, Smith was hired as Borough Manager of Wilkinsburg under a five-
246year employment contract. At the expiration of that contract, the Bor-
ough informed Smith that it would not renew his contract, "but that he
,,247was welcome to reapply for the job along with other applicants.
Smith informed "several council members that he was interested in re-
taining his position, [but] he did not formally submit an application." 248
After the Borough hired Thomas Leach, age 37, Smith applied in writing
for the Borough Manager position.249
When Smith brought suit, the Borough first defended itself by con-
tending that Smith's "performance on the job had been inadequate. '25 °
However, the Borough changed its position after Smith introduced evi-
dence that the Borough had never previously criticized Smith's job per-
formance and Smith showed that "the fiscal health of the Borough had
improved markedly during his tenure., 251 Instead, the Borough explained
238. Id. at 381.
239. Id. at 382 (quoting Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir.
2001).
240. Id.
241. See id. at 379-80.
242. See id. at 379.
243. See id. at 381-82.
244. 147 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 1998).
245. Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d at 274.








"that it did not renew Smith's contract because Smith had not timely
applied for the position. 252
At trial, Smith "requested that the court instruct the jury that it could
infer intentional discrimination if it found the Borough's reasons for not
renewing the contract to be false or not credible. 253 The district judge
"denied Smith's request... stating: '[I]t is error for me to instruct on that
. ..for me to give a pretext instruction would be an error, simple as
that."' 254 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Borough.
255
b. Decision
On appeal, the Third Circuit engaged in an extensive analysis of the
necessity of a pretext jury instruction.256 The court noted that "a finding
,,257
of pretext was a permissible basis for a verdict of discrimination.
Based on this foundation, the Third Circuit stated:
[W]e join the Second Circuit in holding that the jurors must be in-
structed that they are entitled to infer, but need not, that the plaintiff's
ultimate burden of demonstrating intentional discrimination by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence can be met if they find that the facts
needed to make up the prima facie case have been established and
they disbelieve the employer's explanation for its decision.
258
In addition, the Third Circuit explained that under the district court's jury
instruction:
[T]he juror's who found no evidence fitting the examples of circum-
stantial evidence .... but who disbelieved the employer's explana-
tion[,] could reasonably conclude that there was no evidence on
which they would be permitted to base a plaintiff's verdict. This con-
clusion would.., be incorrect as a matter of law.
Without a charge on pretext, the course of the jury's delibera-
tions will depend on whether the jurors are smart enough or intuitive
enough to realize that inferences of discrimination may be drawn
from the evidence establishing plaintiffs prima facie case and the
pretextual nature of the employer's proffered reasons for its action. It





256. See id. at 278-8 1.
257. Id. at 279.
258. Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
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need some instruction in the permissibility of drawing that infer-
259ence.
III. ANALYSIS: A JURY WILL NOT INFER DISCRIMINATION FROM
PRETEXT IF IT Is NOT INSTRUCTED THAT IT Is ALLOWED TO Do So
A pretext jury instruction is important for two reasons. First, the
importance of the pretext jury instruction lies in the rationale for em-
ployment law itself. Employment law is designed, in part, to protect em-
ployees from arbitrary and capricious treatment by their employers. 260 A
pretext jury instruction furthers this rationale. Discharged employees are
generally in a position where they are unable to produce direct evidence
of discrimination.26'The only evidence an employee is likely to have is
circumstantial, as when the circumstances of the firing, combined with
prior treatment of the employee, indicate that the employer had an im-
262proper motive. As such, a pretext instruction to the jury puts a disad-
vantaged employee on equal footing with the employer-filling in gaps
that the employee is simply unable to produce evidence to fill.
Second, only employers are in the position to know the true reasons
an employee was fired. Employers generally do not arbitrarily fire their
employees.263 Their motivation to avoid precisely these types of lawsuits
is the impetus behind keeping extensive performance records, recording
meetings and phone calls, and constantly informing the employee of her
status. When a frivolous employment discrimination case arises, employ-
ers should have more than the necessary evidence to show legitimate
reasons for firing the employee. It is in the cases where the employer
cannot produce such evidence that an air of suspicion arises. When an
employer is faced with an employment discrimination lawsuit brought by
an employee that has little or no direct evidence, and the employer is
unable to convince a jury of legitimate reasons for firing the employee,
259. Id. at 280-81.
260. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (2000), the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000), and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000), are examples of
federal laws that prevent discriminatory practices by employers.
261. Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 1998); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he entire purpose of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of discrimina-
tion is hard to come by"). In Wilkinsburg, the plaintiffs evidence consisted of improved fiscal health
of the Borough during his term as Borough Manager, the absence of negative job performance
ratings, and the fact that plaintiff's replacement was nearly half plaintiff's age. Wilkinsburg, 147
F.3d at 275.
262. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993).
263. An employer should be thoroughly aware of the repercussions of discriminatory activity
in their firing of employees. An aggrieved employee can resort to Title VII, ADA, and ADEA if they
feel they have been wrongfully discharged. Facing such ammunition, an employer has ample impe-
tus to defend himself against an employment discrimination lawsuit. Therefore, an intelligent em-




the logical inference is that the employer had illegitimate motives. A
pretext instruction is an extension of that logical inference.
That logical inference is why pretext instructions have such a criti-
cal effect. When a jury is wary of an employer's proffered reasons for
firing the plaintiff, it is likely that those proffered reasons are illegiti-
mate. A pretext instruction to the jury is critical because, without it, the
members of a jury may be unaware that they are allowed to find for the
plaintiff where the plaintiff's evidence is circumstantial, even though the
employer's evidence is suspicious or unconvincing. Pretext instructions
will help a plaintiff where it is likely that the plaintiff was discriminated
against. Conversely, the pretext instruction will have no effect where the
employer had a legitimate reason to fire the employee, backed by direct
evidence, which is within the employer's competence to give.
The cases in this survey show the critical effect of a pretext jury in-
struction. When a jury is informed that it is permissible to make an infer-
ence of discrimination based on pretext, it finds for the plaintiff.264 In
similar factual situations in other circuits where the jury is not given a
pretext instruction, the jury finds for the defendant.265 The logical infer-
ence is that plaintiffs will prevail in circumstantial evidence cases in the
Second, Third, or Tenth Circuit where they would not in the First, Sev-
enth, Eighth, or Eleventh Circuit. Thus, whether a pretext jury instruction
is given is critical in determining the outcome of circumstantial evidence
employment discrimination cases. This is in light of the fact that the bur-
den-shifting framework in employment discrimination cases is uniform
throughout the circuits.266
The following are two jury instructions used in employment dis-
crimination cases involving circumstantial evidence. The instruction be-
low was used in the Eighth Circuit, which disfavors giving pretext jury
instructions:
2 67
Your verdict must be for the plaintiff .. and against defendant...
on plaintiffs claim of race discrimination if all of the following ele-
ments are proved by the greater weight of the evidence: [f]irst, de-
264. Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas., Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 2002);
Zimmermann v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 383-84 (2d Cir. 2001); Wilkinsburg, 147
F.3d at 281; Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 383-84 (2d Cit. 1994).
265. Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786, 789 (8th Cir. 2001); Palmer v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. Sys., 208 F.3d 969, 975 (11 th Cir. 2000); Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d
64, 70 (7th Cir. 1995); Hill v. Burrell Comm. Group, Inc., 67 F.3d 665, 670 (7th Cir. 1995); Gehring
v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994).
266. When and how the burden-shifting framework is used is subject to some controversy. The
Seventh Circuit relegates the framework exclusively to pretrial proceedings. Gehring, 43 F.3d at
343. The majority of the circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, utilize the burden-shifting framework
throughout the employment discrimination trial. See Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1240. The framework
itself, however, is uniform throughout the Circuits because the Supreme Court set forth the frame-
work in St. Mary's and Reeves.
267. See Moore, 249 F.3d at 789.
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fendant failed to hire plaintiff; and [slecond, Plaintiffs race was a
motivating factor in Defendant's decision. If either of the above ele-
ments has not been proved by the greater weight of the evidence,
your verdict must be for defendant and you need not proceed further
in considering this claim.
268
Compare the above instruction to the following instruction that was
given by the Tenth Circuit in Townsend, and is a standard pretext instruc-
tion:
You may find that plaintiffs race was a motivating factor in defen-
dant's decision to demote or discharge plaintiff if it has been proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's stated reason(s)
for its decision are not the true reasons, but are a "pretext" to hide
discriminatory motivation.
269
Both of these instructions are legally correct. 270 They are both adequate
representations of the law under Reeves and St. Mary's. However, for the
cases that follow, imagine the result had the opposite instruction been
given. 271
Recall Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., discussed above.272 In that case,
had a jury been allowed to decide whether Russell had been discrimi-
nated against, it would have been faced with three different situations
where Russell had been transferred or denied a position in favor of a
younger white man.273 The jury would also have considered Acme's
proffered reasons for its treatment of Russell in light of the racial trend.
Had this case been tried in the Second, Third, or Tenth Circuit, and had
the jury been instructed on an allowed inference of pretext, Russell might
have prevailed.
The Seventh Circuit held, however, that Russell had not produced
sufficient evidence to show discriminatory animus.274 The court also
stated that the evidence required to rebut an employer's proffered rea-
275sons is not within a plaintiffs competence to give.  From this paradox
the Seventh Circuit concluded that "there [was] nothing in their power"
268. Id.
269. Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1236-37. This was the jury instruction that Townsend proposed,
and that was rejected by the District Court, but found sufficient by the Tenth Circuit. Id.
270. Under the Supreme Court's holding in Reeves, it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer
discrimination based on pretext, but such inference is not compulsory. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumb-
ing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2000). Thus, instructing the jury about pretext or refraining
from giving the instruction both adhere to the Reeves precedent.
271. The jury in Moore was given the first example instruction and found for the defendant.
Moore, 249 F.3d at 789. The Tenth Circuit was convinced that had the jury been given the second
instruction in Townsend that the jury would have found in favor of the plaintiff. Townsend, 294 F.3d
at 1236-37.
272. 51 F.3d 64 (7th Cir. 1995).
273. Russell, 51 F.3d at 67.
274. See id. at 71.
275. See id. at 68.
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to alleviate this burden on a plaintiff.276 There is a resolution to this prob-
lem: give the case to a jury and let a jury decide whether an employer
discriminated against an employee.
277Compare Zimmerman v. Associates First Capital Corp., a Second
Circuit case, to Russell. In Zimmerman, the plaintiff, Zimmerman, pre-
vailed using exclusively circumstantial evidence. She showed a pattern
of sex discrimination by her employer and ambiguous and contradictory
statements made by her immediate supervisor.278 The evidence Russell
presented against Acme was at least as probative as what was presented
by Zimmermann. While there are factual differences between the cases,
it appears that the determinative factor in the divergent results is whether
the jury was given a pretext instruction. 279 Russell probably would have
prevailed had he been able to remove his case from the Seventh Circuit
to the Second, Third, or Tenth Circuit.
Next, recall Hill v. Burrell Communications Group, Inc., another
Seventh Circuit decision. The Seventh Circuit's conclusion in Hill is
precisely why the issue of pretext must be given to a jury. Hill introduced
circumstantial evidence that Burrell's actions were discriminatory. Hill
showed that she, a white woman, was fired in a general downsizing
scheme, but was replaced by a member of a minority group to do sub-281
stantially the same job. She next introduced a statement by her super-
visor that showed she was to be replaced by a minority candidate.282 Fi-
nally, the type of work Burrell engaged in, advertising in minority mar-
283kets, provided a motive for firing Hill. Burrell responded by offering a
reason why Hill was fired.28 In the Second, Third, and Tenth Circuit, the
jury would have been allowed to judge the credibility of each party's
explanation. Further, the jury would have been instructed that if it found
that the plaintiff satisfied her prima facie burden, and if it disbelieved
Burrell's proffered reasons, it would be allowed to find for the plaintiff.
This is why the outcome of the case probably would have been different
had it been brought in one of those circuits.
Finally, recall Palmer v. Board of Regents.285 Again, imagine the re-
sult had Palmer's claim been brought in the Tenth Circuit. Palmer ap-
276. Id. at 71.
277. 251 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2001).
278. Zimmerman, 251 F.3d at 379.
279. Compare Russell, 51 F.3d at 67-8, with Zimmermann, 251 F.3d at 379. In Russell's case
the district court did not allow the claim to even reach the jury; the court granted summary judgment
in favor of the employer. Russell, 51 F.3d at 67.
280. 67 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 1995).
281. Hill, 67 F.3d at 667.
282. Id.
283. See id. at 666.
284. See id.
285. 208 F.3d 969 (11 th Cir. 2000).
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plied for a permanent position at the University, but was denied.286
Palmer had circumstantial evidence that the University's proffered rea-
sons for its employment decision were pretextual,287 yet "the jury was not
specifically informed that it was authorized to find for the Plaintiff with-
out any additional evidence of discrimination. 288 Because the jury was
not specifically informed of the allowed inference, the defendant pre-
vailed.
CONCLUSION
The cases in this survey have shown the critical effect of a pretext
jury instruction. In factually similar circumstances, whether the jury was
given a pretext instruction determined the outcome. In the Second, Third,
and Tenth Circuit, where pretext instructions are given, plaintiffs tend to
prevail where they probably would not have in the First, Seventh, Eighth,
or Eleventh Circuit. Because Townsend is such a recent case, Townsend's
implication and impact in the Tenth Circuit has not yet been fully real-
ized. However, because of the effect a pretext instruction has on the out-
come of employment discrimination cases, it is likely that a pro-plaintiff
trend will soon evolve in the Tenth Circuit in circumstantial evidence
employment discrimination cases.
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